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THE COURT’S DECISIVE HAND SHAPES THE EXECUTIVE’S 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS POLICYMAKING POWER 
KIMBERLEY L. FLETCHER∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 A dynamic institutional relationship exists between the United 
States executive branch and the United States Supreme Court.  
This Article examines how the Court affects constitutional and 
political development by taking a leading role in interpreting 
presidential decisionmaking in the area of foreign affairs since 
1936.  Examining key cases and controversies in foreign policy-
making, primarily in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this 
Article highlights the patterns of intercurrences and the mutual 
construction process that take place at the juncture of legal and 
political time.  In so doing, it is more than evident that the Court 
not only sanctions the claims made by executives of unilateral de-
cisionmaking, but also takes a leading role in (re)defining the 
very scope and breadth of executive foreign policymaking. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the United States has carved out a constitutional 
space for executive unilateralism in the area of foreign affairs since render-
ing its decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.1 (“Curtiss-
Wright”) in 1936.  The Court’s decision in Curtiss-Wright forever changed 
the trajectory of the executive branch—prior to 1936, the Court decided 
cases in favor of a strong Legislature formulating American foreign policy, 
which undermined a president’s claim to executive unilateralism—and 
placed the Court at the forefront of (re)defining the scope and path of for-
eign affairs powers.  The utilization of this policy-making tool by the Exec-
utive cements the dynamic nature of the Court in how it has altered the con-
stitutional and political development of both branches of government. 
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Scholars that track doctrinal development in the area of foreign affairs 
simply note a shift in power and explain how this change has resulted in ex-
ecutives claiming broad unilateral powers.  To understand this shift, how-
ever, we must refocus our analysis to include a more detailed evaluation of 
judicial decisionmaking and ask: how do we account for the Court’s deci-
sion to move away from the established constitutional blueprint set by the 
Court’s early judicial rulings, to advocating for a strong presidential pres-
ence in foreign policymaking?  What is it about this moment in time that 
prompted the Supreme Court to move away from precedent and assert that 
the Executive has a leading role in foreign affairs?  What factors—internal 
and external—existed at the time of the ruling to influence the Court to ren-
der a decision of this kind?  To understand more fully this developmental 
shift and its subsequent impact, we cannot focus solely on the internal doc-
trinal world—this is only useful to illustrate that a doctrinal shift took place 
in 1936—or on the external political world.  Rather, we must focus on the 
intersection of legal and political time (two concepts that will be explained 
below), which will parse out the factors that constrain judicial decisionmak-
ing, and highlight the context in which a case reaches the Court.  In so do-
ing, we can determine whether the inclusion of foreign affairs, an area that 
has been largely understudied in this way, adds to or changes the current 
developmental narratives of the executive and judicial branches.  This brief 
overview of some of the most significant cases the Court has decided since 
Curtiss-Wright showcases the influential role of the Court on the institu-
tional dynamics of the Executive and shows that the Court has empowered, 
and legally sanctioned, unilateral presidential action in foreign policymak-
ing. 
The Court does not operate independently from the political system 
and is therefore situated at the juncture of law and politics.  Since political 
and legal time operate differently, it is important to understand how the 
juncture of these two concepts impacts Supreme Court decisionmaking and 
how, in turn, the Court impacts the political and constitutional development 
of the executive branch when the Court decides a foreign affairs case.  Do-
ing so will help facilitate an understanding of the dynamic institutional rela-
tionship between the Court and the executive branch.  On the one hand, po-
litical time, as defined by Stephen Skowronek, is the “various relationships 
incumbents project between previously established commitments of ideolo-
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gy and interest,” and the President’s response to the perceived emergency.2  
Skowronek’s explanation of political time helps situate the presidency in 
American political development.  Legal time, on the other hand, is defined 
by how the “Supreme Court interacts with the world outside the Court,”3 
including external factors or constraints occurring in political time.  Legal 
time is quite different from the political time of the presidency, and it is this 
difference that has significant implications on the process of judicial deci-
sionmaking.  Courts are therefore “positioned at the juncture of law and 
politics,” and the unique quality of the Court is “inherent in the nature of 
judicial power.”4  To further understand the positioning of the Court, I draw 
from Ronald Kahn’s discussion of the mutual construction process to illus-
trate how judicial decisionmaking is influenced by external factors.5  The 
internal norms of the Court and the external factors that exist in political 
time are therefore explanatory conditions to understanding the constraints 
placed on judicial decisionmaking and doctrinal change. 
When the Court decides to hear a foreign affairs case, it makes consti-
tutional choices that, at times, may challenge the primary commitments of 
the majority coalition and the major political institution of the Executive.  
Alternatively, the Court may choose key moments in which to collaborate 
with an institution and make legal the construction and stabilization of an 
asserted political order.  Irrespective of the decision rendered, these consti-
tutional choices demonstrate a continuous and constitutive dynamic rela-
tionship between both the Court and the executive branch.  In the area of 
foreign affairs, the Court has helped advance legal and political frames 
since 1936, and these are narrative frames that the Court has appeared all 
too willing to create. 
The Court, as a decisionmaker, is intertwined with the political system.  
Foreign affairs are no exception to this general paradigm.  In 1936, Justice 
Sutherland’s overarching decision in Curtiss-Wright illustrates a sharp de-
parture for the Court.  The following historical account of some notable epi-
                                                          
 2.  STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN 
ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 30 (6th prtg. 2003). 
 3.  Ronald Kahn, The Constitution May Be Undemocratic, but Not Supreme Court Decision-
making: The Difference Between Legal and Political Time, DIGITAL COMMONS@UM CAREY 
LAW 3 (2006), http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context=schmooze_papers. 
 4.  Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch, THE SUPREME COURT & AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 16 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006). 
 5.  See Kahn, supra note 3, at 4–7. 
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sodes between the Executive and the judicial branch demonstrates that this 
change in path trajectory gives the Executive the legal positioning to ad-
vance broad claims to unilateral executive decisionmaking.  As such, we 
have borne witness to some outlandish claims by presidents, which have 
found favor from the Court.  In an attempt to understand this rapid growth 
in power since 1936, I will highlight both the internal legal norms and ex-
ternal social and political constraints to demonstrate the fused process that 
yields a superior position for the Executive over the legislative branch in 
the area of foreign affairs. 
II.  EARLY JUDICIAL RULINGS 
Prior to 1936, the Supreme Court decided foreign affairs cases in favor 
of a strong Legislature and often limited the scope and parameters of the 
dual partnership between Congress and the Executive.  For example, when 
examining Congress’s constitutional authority to declare war, the Court 
found that it was the sole responsibility of the Legislature to wage a “par-
tial” or “limited” war.6  And only when Congress authorizes war was the 
President called in to serve as Commander in Chief.7  The President, how-
ever, was not at liberty to choose the time, location or scope of military ac-
tivities.8  The Court reaffirmed these judicial decisions in 1804 in Little v. 
Barreme.9  In short, as Louis Fisher summarized, “[p]residential orders, 
even those issued as Commander in Chief in time of war, are subject to re-
strictions imposed by Congress.”10  Essentially, the Court asserted that the 
President does not have inherent powers that give him the authority to ig-
nore a law passed by Congress.11  The one caveat the President had in this 
                                                          
 6.  Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 43 (1800). 
 7.  See Louis Fisher, Domestic Commander in Chief: Early Checks by Other Branches, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 961, 968 (2008) (discussing Congress’s power to declare war and the Presi-
dent’s power to direct war). 
 8.  See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 9–16 (1801) (discussing various acts by Congress that 
designated military details for the war against France).  
 9. 6 U.S. 170 (1804). For a summary of the issue in Barreme, see Fisher, supra note 7, at 
997 (“Part of the legislation passed by Congress in the 1798–1800 period, to authorize war against 
France, authorized the President to seize vessels sailing to French ports.  President Adams exceed-
ed the statute by issuing a proclamation that directed American ships to capture vessels sailing to 
or from French ports.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 10.  See Fisher, supra note 7, at 997.   
 11.  See Barreme, 6 U.S. at 177 (noting that President Adams’s orders clearly went beyond 
the congressional statute). 
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area was in the event that the United States was invaded, it would be lawful 
for the Executive to oppose such an invasion.12  This notion was based on 
defending the nation and the idea that the President would seek out retroac-
tive legislation.  As the Circuit Court for the District of New York stated in 
its 1806 decision in United States v. Smith13: “Does [the President] possess 
the power of making war?  That power is exclusively vested in Con-
gress . . . .”14  Thus, if the United States was invaded, the President had only 
the constitutional authority and obligation to resist with force, but “it is the 
exclusive province of congress to change a state of peace into a state of 
war.”15 
Later that century, the Court would address a president’s exercise of 
military power without first procuring congressional approval.16  Following 
the attacks on Fort Sumter in April 1861, and with Congress in recess, Pres-
ident Abraham Lincoln issued proclamations calling forth the state militia.17  
He also suspended the writ of habeas corpus and placed a blockade on 
southern ports (resulting in the capture of several prizes and their cargoes) 
and rebellious states.18  Lincoln, acutely aware that his actions were illegal, 
requested statutory authorization from Congress.19  While Congress ratified 
Lincoln’s actions,20 this situation marked the first time the Court would 
                                                          
 12.  See Act of May 2, 1792, 1 Stat. 264–65 (“An Act to Provide for Calling forth the Militia 
to Execute the Laws of the Union, Suppress Insurrection, and Repel Invasions.”); see also Fisher, 
supra note 7, at 976 (“As enacted, the militia bill provided that whenever the United States shall 
be invaded, or be ‘in imminent danger of invasion’ . . . the president was authorized to call forth 
such number of the militia as he may judge necessary to repel the invasion.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 13.  27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16342). 
 14.  Id. at 1230. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (holding that the President did not 
have the authority to order blockade and impound ships, even without formal declaration of war). 
 17.  Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive Action 
and Judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 56–57 (Christopher H. 
Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
 18.  Id. at 57–59. 
 19.  See id. at 56–57 (noting that Lincoln called Congress in April 1861 to meet for a special 
session in July). 
 20.  See id. at 59 (“Congress approved in just over a week an array of wartime measures, in-
cluding funding and authorizing an expanded army and navy.”). 
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hear a case involving the power of the President to respond to sudden at-
tacks.21 
In The Prize Cases,22 the Court, while sharply divided (five to four), 
reasoned that the President could not initiate war, as that authority was re-
served for Congress, and Congress alone.23  Lincoln found the secession of 
several states and the possibility of open hostilities to be enough justifica-
tion to impose a blockade on the southern ports.24  While the President is 
duty bound to rise to the challenge of invasion by a foreign nation to repel 
sudden attacks,25 Lincoln subverted this point, by declaring the Confedera-
cy as belligerents.  And, the commander-in-chief clause gave the President 
the authority to proclaim a blockade as a method of waging war.26  Justice 
Robert C. Grier, who wrote the majority opinion in The Prize Cases, how-
ever, placed limits on the President’s power to act defensively: “He has no 
power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domes-
tic State.”27 
These early judicial decisions demonstrate the entrenched path the 
Court set for the partnership between the legislative and executive branches.  
Assigning Congress the sole responsibility of initiating hostilities, whether 
in the form of a general or limited war, left the President, in his capacity as 
Commander in Chief, with only the power to repel sudden invasions against 
the United States.28 
So what changed?  How have presidents aggrandized so much power 
to the point of telling the Supreme Court that they have no power of re-
view?  Harold H. Koh suggests that there are three reasons why the Execu-
tive always appears to have the leading hand when asserting a strong domi-
                                                          
 21.  See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 47 (2004) (discussing the Court’s af-
firmation of Lincoln’s emergency measures).  The duty to repel sudden attacks signifies an emer-
gency measure that grants the President the discretion to take actions necessary to resist a sudden 
invasion that is waged either against the mainland or against American troops abroad.  See id. at 
47–48. 
 22.  The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
 23.  Id. at 668. 
 24.  Lee & Ramsey, supra note 17, at 56–58. 
 25.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 26.  See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 666 (“That the President, as the Executive Chief of the 
Government and Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, was the proper person to make such 
notification [of a blockade], has not been, and cannot be disputed.”). 
 27.  Id. at 668. 
 28.  These early decisions have never been overturned and remain the law of the land today. 
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nant role in foreign affairs.29  First, the Executive takes the initiative pri-
marily by “construing laws designed to constrain his actions as authoriza-
tions”—as is evident by the use of the War Powers Resolution.30  Second, 
Congress has, more often than not, complied with or acquiesced in what ac-
tions the President has chosen to take.31  And lastly, judicial tolerance, 
which is a point of departure from Koh’s argument in terms of the position 
held in this Article. 
III.  CURTISS-WRIGHT—A DEFINING CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT 
The 1936 case of Curtiss-Wright marks the first step for the Court to 
embark on a new path to (re)define the President’s role in foreign affairs 
and assert itself as the institution to do so.  This new role for both branches 
over time has led to a comprehensive national acceptance “of the systematic 
legal entrenchment” of an executive acting unilaterally in foreign policy-
making.  In many ways, Curtiss-Wright marked the end of an era.  Follow-
ing this decision, executives have gained significant momentum in this area, 
and, with successive decisions by the Court, we have seen a distinct judicial 
conjecture in favor of executive power in the area of foreign policymaking.  
In the following discussion, I will demonstrate that Curtiss-Wright set a 
new precedent for how the Court (re)defines executive authority and how 
the Court has come to regard the Legislature as a secondary institution to 
that of the executive branch.  It is not until 2006 when the Court hears the 
case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld32 that it admonishes (but not in formal legal 
terms) the legislative branch to be a more active participant in the area of 
foreign policymaking, specifically requiring Congress to grant statutory au-
                                                          
 29.  Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, in THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 158–80 (David Gray Adler & 
Larry N. George eds., 1996). 
 30.  Id. at 158.  Primarily drafted to halt creeping wars like Vietnam, the Resolution has come 
to symbolize, because of drafting flaws, statutory authorization undercutting the effectiveness in 
restraining the President from initiating hostilities.  Id.  Consequently, when the President decides 
to “violate[] congressionally imposed procedural constraints in pursuit of substantive policies that 
they favor,” he does so under the guise of the Resolution.  Id. at 172.  
 31.  Koh argues that this is evident through “legislative myopia, inadequate drafting, ineffec-
tive legislative tools, or sheer lack of political will.”  Id. at 158. 
 32.  548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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thorization for the use of military commissions, which it did by passing the 
Military Commissions Act33 (“MCA”) in 2006. 
The Court decided Curtiss-Wright at the height of President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s “personalization and institutionalization of the presidency,” 
which amongst many initiatives included an “extrovert phase in American 
foreign policy.”34  This marked the nation’s arrival as the world’s hegemon-
ic power.35  As such, geopolitical concerns would, in a number of cases, act 
as external constraints on the Court.  Essentially, Curtiss-Wright involved 
the principles of governmental regulation of business and the supremacy of 
the executive branch in the conduct of foreign affairs.36  The Court asserted 
that while the Constitution does not explicitly vest in the President the au-
thority to conduct foreign policy, it is given implicitly through the com-
mander-in-chief clause, thereby empowering the Executive to conduct for-
eign affairs in a way that Congress can and should not.37  In fact, the Court 
stated the President had “plenary” powers in the area of foreign affairs that 
was not dependent on congressional delegation.38  The Court, for the first 
time, significantly changed the course and direction of constitutional and 
political development for the executive branch in Curtiss-Wright. 
The Court strategically positioned itself to redefine the scope and di-
rection of the Executive’s prerogatives, which sanctions the “extrovert 
phase” instituted by FDR.39  It did this, first and foremost, by deciding to 
hear the case and decide the case on its merits.  As scholars have noted, the 
Court could have invoked the political question doctrine and not hear the 
case.40  Second, it did so by redistributing the balance of power between the 
                                                          
 33.  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as 
amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948–50).  
 34.  Koh, supra note 29, at 160 (noting that this time period began before the attacks on Pearl 
Harbor and ended with the Vietnam War). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 305–06 (1936). 
 37.  Id. at 319–20. 
 38.  Id. at 320. 
 39.  See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 96 (1990) (discussing the activist presidency of FDR, when the 
“United States assumed unchallenged status as the world’s ‘hegemon’”). 
 40.  See, e.g., David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 29, at 39 (“[The 
Court’s] invocation of the political-question doctrine has been a major means by which the judici-
ary has strengthened the role of the president in the conduct of foreign policy.”). 
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executive and legislative branches in the area of foreign affairs.  But, why 
did the Court make this move in 1936?  What are the dynamics at play 
when legal and political time intersect that make this case the “perfect 
storm,” permitting the Court to (re)define presidential powers and shift au-
thority away from Congress to the President in this area?  Is political time 
really influencing legal time?  And, how does this doctrinal development 
influence the political development of the executive branch? 
Scholars have been highly critical of Justice George Sutherland’s theo-
ry on the separation of powers and, accordingly, have been quick to point 
out that Justice Robert H. Jackson in the Steel Seizure case of 1952 noted 
that much of Sutherland’s opinion is dictum.41  Despite this criticism, it is a 
worthwhile enterprise to (re)evaluate this case not only because of the 
sweeping language but also because it is the lynchpin of many of the execu-
tive branch’s subsequent claims of the power to act without congressional 
authorization in foreign affairs. 
During the 1930s, the Court served as a check on New Deal legisla-
tion.42  At every turn in national policy where the cleavage between the old 
and new regime was distinct, FDR was confronted with a judiciary predom-
inantly held over from the old order.  But the Court’s eventual support of 
FDR’s New Deal legislation, coupled with an expanded view of executive 
powers in the area of foreign affairs, helped facilitate the federal govern-
ment’s growth in authority and responsibility. 
In response to a potential war breaking out in the Chaco region of 
South America, Congress authorized President Roosevelt to place an em-
bargo on shipments carrying arms to countries at war in the region, specifi-
cally Paraguay and Bolivia since they were engaged, at that time, in a cross-
border conflict.43  Acting pursuant to the authorization of a joint resolution, 
President Roosevelt issued Proclamation 2087 in May 1934, forbidding the 
shipment of arms to the combatants in the Chaco region.44  Curtiss-Wright 
                                                          
 41.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635–36 n.2 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 42.  See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down New Deal 
legislation on the grounds that they characterized unconstitutionally broad delegations of legisla-
tive power to the Executive); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 
(1935) (same). 
 43.  See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 311–12 (1936) (detail-
ing Joint Resolution 48 Stat. 811). 
 44.  See id. at 312–13 (detailing Presidential Proclamation 2087); see also Proclamation No. 
2087, 48 Stat. 1744 (1934), available at 
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Export Corporation was charged with plotting to sell fifteen machine guns 
to Bolivia.45  This sale violated Presidential Proclamation 2087, and 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation was indicted for violating the embar-
go.46  The question before the Supreme Court was whether the congression-
al resolution was an unlawful delegation of legislative power.47 
While the Court had already struck down significant pieces of New 
Deal legislation, it was now faced with a case involving executive preroga-
tives in foreign policymaking.  With the reproaches by the Court in the do-
mestic arena, the Court was now positioned to render yet another decision 
that might again be in opposition to the commitments of the majority coali-
tion.  So, how would the Court read discretionary executive power in this 
area?  Would the external framing of the situation and the administration’s 
asserted authority to act influence the Court’s decision? 
Justice Sutherland48 found that the joint resolution was constitution-
al.49  Now, why would the leader of the conservative bloc, Justice Suther-
land, write an expansive view of presidential authority to conduct foreign 
policy?  Part of the answer comes from his early and developing princi-
ples—when he served as Senator and Blumenthal lecturer at Columbia 
University before joining the Court—of the division between domestic and 
                                                          
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14888#axzz1lpVgJyPc (“Forbidding the 
Shipment of Arm to the Combatants in Chaco”).  On November 14, 1935, FDR issued a second 
proclamation that revoked the previous proclamation, finding the prohibition on the sale of arms 
to Bolivia and Paraguay no longer necessary since the war between the two countries had come to 
an end.  See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 313; see also Proclamation No. 2147, 49 Stat. 3480 
(1935), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
ws/index.php?pid=14978 (“Revoking the Arms Embargo at termination of Hostilities in the Cha-
co”) . 
 45.  Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  This prerogative is a legislative determination, the lawyers argued on behalf of the Exec-
utive, and Congress was leaving this right to the Executive’s “unfettered discretion.”  Id. at 314–
15.  This claim had judicial support, though Congressional Democrats and the White House were 
severely critical of the Court’s decisions.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 48.  The only opinion ascribed is that of Justice Sutherland; Chief Justice Hughes; Justices 
Sutherland, Van Devanter, Brandeis, Butler, Roberts, and Cardozo made up the majority opinion.  
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311.  Justice McReynolds dissented, yet there is no recorded dissent, 
only a note at the end of Justice Sutherland’s opinion that Justice McReynolds believed “the court 
below reached the right conclusion and its judgment ought to be affirmed.”  Id. at 333.  Justice 
Stone took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.  Id.  
 49.  Id. at 329. 
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foreign affairs powers granted to the government by the Constitution.50  As 
demonstrated below, Justice Sutherland’s expansive view of presidential 
authority to conduct foreign policy was, perhaps, an obvious evolution of 
his visible agenda. 
Justice Sutherland was a strict constructionist and tended to align with 
the Court’s conservative side.51  In fact, Justice Sutherland was regarded as 
the leader of the conservative52 bloc when a sharp division on the bench ex-
isted.  By the time he reached the Court and a new constitutional order was 
under way, Justice Sutherland’s early theories on the Executive’s external 
powers had matured, and a sharp distinction between domestic and foreign 
affairs now existed.  He argued that there was a clear and definitive ap-
proach to deciding federal claims of foreign and domestic authority.53  
Broad delegations of power were unconstitutional—the Court’s reasoning 
behind striking down New Deal legislation—even though Justice Suther-
land advocated, early on in his career, for a broad reading of the Constitu-
tion: the Constitution must have the “capacity for indefinite extension” for 
those who came after the Constitution was framed and adopted.54  In his 
early writings, Justice Sutherland said rather little on the matter of presiden-
tial constitutional powers.  What he did say in Curtiss-Wright was that the 
President had the sole responsibility to negotiate with foreign powers.55 
While Justice Sutherland valued the doctrine of stare decisis, he ar-
gued that precedent was not a fixed pathway, since it is the opinion only of 
the person who came before and that person stipulated where the pathway 
should be.56  Path dependency of precedent in constitutional law, for Justice 
                                                          
 50.  See George Sutherland, The Internal and External Powers of the National Government, 
191 N. AM. REV. 373, 374–75 (1910) (discussing differing levels of government power when the 
government addresses internal versus external affairs). 
 51.  PETER G. RENSTROM, THE TAFT COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY, 79–80 
(2003).  Justice Sutherland was part of the conservative “Four Horsemen,” which included Justic-
es McReynolds, Devanter, and Butler—the four conservatives, holdovers from the Taft Court, 
often convinced Justice Roberts to side with them, which gave them the majority.  Id.  These jus-
tices were instrumental in striking down Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation.  Id. at 80. 
 52.  With Justice Sutherland’s decision in Curtiss-Wright, it is evident that conservatism does 
not map in exactly the same way when we examine foreign affairs cases because Justice Suther-
land was also an advocate for woman suffrage and female equality. 
 53.  See Sutherland, supra note 50. 
 54.  GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 50 (1919). 
 55.  United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
 56.  Senator George Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, Address Before the Ameri-
can Bar Association 386 (Aug. 28, 1912).   
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Sutherland, was not a controlling factor; and constitutional decisionmaking 
on the Court would therefore be based in part on a Justice’s personal policy 
preferences or strategic objectives.57 
After conveniently narrowing the question before the Court, Justice 
Sutherland was free to begin the discussion with an account of his theory 
from Constitutional Power and World Affairs.58  He contended that there 
are fundamental differences between the powers employed by the federal 
government in the area of domestic affairs and external or foreign matters.59  
The resolution delegating power to the Executive, he argued, might have 
been unlawful if it had only applied to our Nation’s internal affairs.60  For-
eign affairs are a different issue, Justice Sutherland asserted, because differ-
ent rules and standards apply.61  Thus, Congress could delegate powers to 
the Executive with a general set of standards or could give unrestricted dis-
cretion.62  Going one step further, Justice Sutherland stated that the powers 
granted to Congress could be exercised or delegated to the President and are 
not limited to the express and implied powers constitutionally granted.63  
Any limitations were only applicable to internal affairs.64  What is more, the 
President exercised “plenary and exclusive power,” which is independent of 
any legislative authority, since he was the sole organ of the federal govern-
ment in the field of international relations.65 
 Justice Sutherland wove another concept into his conclusion, one 
that was practically absent from his Constitutional Power and World Af-
fairs66 manuscript.  He asserted that there is a significant limitation when 
exercising power in the area of foreign affairs.  This rhetorical caveat was 
developed in his most famous passage of all.  In what some have called “ill-
                                                          
 57.  Id.; see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 903, 974 (2005) (“The point is not just that opinions reflect the differences among the 
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sary.”). 
 58.  SUTHERLAND, supra note 54. 
 59.  Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315–16. 
 60.  Id. at 315. 
 61.  Id. at 315–16. 
 62.  Id. at 316. 
 63.  Id. at 319–20. 
 64.  Id. at 316. 
 65.  Id. at 320.  It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia’s decisions regarding sovereignty in 
international law mirrors, to a large degree, Justice Sutherland’s interpretation of sovereignty. 
 66. SUTHERLAND, supra note 54. 
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considered dicta,”67 Justice Sutherland contended that the role of foreign 
affairs rested in the hands of the Executive.68  His opinion invoked Con-
gressman John Marshall’s reference to the President as the “sole organ” of 
American foreign policy in a speech he delivered to the House of Repre-
sentatives in 1800.69  In that speech, Marshall asserted that the President 
was the “sole organ” of communication.70  Justice Sutherland’s reference to 
Marshall’s remark implies that the President makes foreign policy unilater-
ally. 
It is remarkable that Justice Sutherland would distort Marshall’s refer-
ence to such a degree in order to ground his own assertions in a historical 
frame.  Justice Sutherland’s reference would be powerful evidence given 
Marshall’s elevation a year later to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  
When read in context, however, Marshall meant only that the President 
communicates American foreign policy to other nations after it has been 
adopted.71  Marshall clearly meant that the President was the “sole organ” 
in implementing—that is, merely announcing, not formulating—American 
foreign policy.72  Thus, the President would be the “sole organ” of commu-
nication; the nation would be speaking with a single voice.73  Marshall’s 
account of the President as the “sole organ” of foreign affairs, however, is 
commonly distorted.  It speaks volumes for Marshall’s view that, as Chief 
Justice, he never invoked the “sole organ” doctrine in defense of unilateral 
executive power in foreign affairs, though he had many opportunities to do 
so.74  In short, articulating the nation’s foreign policy to other countries did 
not carry with it any form of inherent power.  Justice Sutherland’s reliance 
                                                          
 67.  Adler, supra note 40, at 25. 
 68.  Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20. 
 69.  Id. at 319 (“As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of 
Representatives, ‘The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole 
representative with foreign affairs.’”  (citing 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800))). 
 70.  10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613–14 (1800).  Justice Sutherland infused Marshall’s phrase with 
a substantive policy-making role, a claim not grounded in Marshall’s speech. 
 71.  See Louis Fisher, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The “Sole Organ” Doctrine, 
37 PRES. STUD. Q. 139, 142 (2007) (clarifying Marshall’s “sole organ” speech). 
 72.  See id. (“Although it [is] the president’s constitutional duty to carry out the law, includ-
ing treaties, ‘Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode.’” (quoting Marshall’s speech)).  
Indeed, first and foremost, Marshall was referring to the President’s authority to “communicate,” 
not “make” American foreign policy. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613–14 (1800).   
 73.  10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613–14 (1800).   
 74.  See Fisher, supra note 71, at 142–43 (discussing Marshall’s approach to foreign affairs 
cases as Chief Justice). 
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upon Marshall’s speech as a foundation of the “sole organ” doctrine is thus 
indefensible.  Yet, it is a measure of Justice Sutherland’s mischief that con-
fusion about Marshall’s speech has been pervasive ever since. 
Justice Sutherland’s opinion is evidence of a change of heart from his 
1919 defense of Congress’s authority and role in foreign affairs against fed-
eralism and the “narrow-construction attack to an assertion of the foreign-
affairs authority of the president that stresses its independence of Con-
gress.”75  This change of heart76 might be accredited, as discussed below, to 
the external factors—the government’s argument, historical practice, and 
the geopolitical impact of the growth of Fascism—that Justice Sutherland’s 
opinion embraces. 
On the initial reading of Justice Sutherland’s opinion, it is difficult to 
ascertain what his assertions have to do with the question of delegation.  
However, if one considers H. Jefferson Powell’s reading of Justice Suther-
land’s opinion77 and grants Justice Sutherland some latitude, one can con-
sider that, since foreign affairs powers do not originate from the Constitu-
tion, they cannot be defined by it and are therefore plenary except when 
they are limited by “applicable provisions of the Constitution.”78  Continu-
ing with this line of thought, Sutherland can then assert that the distribution 
of these powers are not created; rather, the Constitution makes the President 
the “sole organ of the federal government in the field of international rela-
tions,”79 and puts few limitations on his management of those affairs.  The 
President’s power in this area is therefore “delicate, plenary and exclu-
sive.”80  If the President is the primary decisionmaker in the realm of for-
eign policy—in the sense that Justice Sutherland is arguing that this is 
structural in an extra-constitutional sense—and the President is responsible 
for formulating that policy, then it naturally follows that a delegation rule 
constructed to protect Congress’s role in defining policy is quite simply and 
plausibly, according to Justice Sutherland’s assertion, inapplicable.81  
                                                          
 75.  H. Jefferson Powell, The Story of Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, in PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER STORIES 195, 222 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
 76.  Sutherland’s early work warns about the growth of presidential powers, but this opinion 
is clear evidence of him changing his mind.   
 77.  Powell, supra note 75, at 195–96. 
 78.  United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 321–22. 
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Moreover, and this is the point at which Justice Sutherland embraces ele-
ments of the government’s argument, when Congress legislates in foreign 
affairs, it appropriately takes into account the President’s control, in princi-
ple and in practice, of intelligence, secrecy, and negotiation, which are ar-
gued to be essential factors to the success of foreign policy.82 
Justice Sutherland continued to discuss the issue further—relying fun-
damentally on a structural argument—by pointing out the history of legisla-
tion that had been granted to the President, which gave him broad discre-
tionary power over international trade and other interrelated issues.83 
Given the trajectory of Justice Sutherland’s theory and his assertions in 
his written opinion for the Court, the decision rendered in Curtiss-Wright 
was perhaps an observable evolution of his obvious schema, but not neces-
sarily predetermined.  This was a period of modernization for the presiden-
cy, but also a time that permanently ended American isolation from Euro-
pean and world affairs.  In the 1930s, Congress and the country were 
determined to remain an isolationist nation and stay out of the war raging in 
Europe.  But President Roosevelt, acutely aware of the impact of Hitler’s 
progression, attempted to ally with France and Great Britain against Hitler’s 
and Mussolini’s regimes. 
The political timing of this case was not only a determining factor on 
the severity of the President’s response to the situation at hand and the Cha-
co war more broadly, but also how the Court would weigh the external con-
straints when reaching its decision, as is evident by the geopolitical context 
of the case.84  This constraining external factor may account for Justice 
Sutherland (re)framing and reformulating an opinion that embraces an ex-
panded role for the Executive.  This case highlights the juncture of legal and 
political time, which created a constitutional moment that presented the 
                                                          
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 322–24. 
 84.  One way in which FDR wanted to counter Fascist advances was in the discretionary con-
trol over neutrality.  An arms embargo against Italy and Ethiopia, for example, would achieve 
Roosevelt’s agenda.  See ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN 
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a president’s claim to a vast power in foreign affairs and, more specifically, President Roosevelt’s 
quest for “‘authority for him to exercise wide discretion in limiting exports to combatants.’”  See 
Powell, supra note 75, at 225 (quoting Robert C. Albright, Highest Court Affirms Arms Embargo 
Act, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1936, at 1).  The Washington Post emphasized that the case “was gen-
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discretionary with the President, rather than mandatory.”  Id.   
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Court with an opportunity to redefine the Executive’s powers through the 
mutual construction process. 
As H. Jefferson Powell aptly notes, the Curtiss-Wright opinion played 
no significant role in the tug-of-war between the Executive and Congress 
“over whether to grant the president discretionary arms-embargo authority 
or impose on him a mandatory and impartial duty of neutrality in terminat-
ing American arms sales to warring states.”85  Those opposing FDR had the 
upper hand.  In fact, Congress blatantly ignored the Court when it insisted 
that Congress grant the Executive broad discretion.86 
The case also played a rather narrow role as precedent in the first few 
years of its decision.87  What Curtiss-Wright did do was set the stage for 
Justice Sutherland to speak again to the role of the President in foreign af-
fairs.  It also established a newly constructed constitutional blueprint for 
executive supremacy in this area.  Although Justice Sutherland’s opinion 
insinuates that the President can make foreign policy unilaterally, the signif-
icance of this case is not immediately established.  In fact, it did not have 
any real impact for almost two decades.  The result of the case is its evolu-
tion as precedent over time and how it became embedded in future presi-
dential claims of broad discretionary power. 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer88 provides what some 
would argue is the end point to the impact of Curtiss-Wright.89  This is a 
compelling assertion, since those who argue this point highlight the fact 
that, by 1952, the delegation issue had retreated in significance and the spe-
cific holding in Curtiss-Wright was insignificant.90  To the contrary, United 
States v. Belmont91 and United States v. Pink92—two cases decided in the 
                                                          
 85.  Powell, supra note 75, at 225. 
 86.  See id. at 226 (“Sutherland’s opinion left Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry un-
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 89.  See, e.g., Powell, supra note 75, at 227 (“The Supreme Court’s celebrated decision inval-
idating President Truman’s seizure of the steel industry in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
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immediate aftermath of Curtiss-Wright—along with Johnson v. Eisentrag-
er,93 are all cases that demonstrate the Court’s continued adherence to Jus-
tice Sutherland’s disinclination to be “in haste”94 to meddle with the Execu-
tive’s management of foreign affairs.95 
IV.  EXECUTIVE UNILATERAL CLAIMS OF EMERGENCY POWERS DURING 
WORLD WAR II 
The next time the Court heard a challenge to the Executive’s claim of 
unilateral policymaking is with the Japanese Internment Cases.96  These 
cases came out of a time when many people in the United States, reeling 
from the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, believed that Imperi-
al Japan was waging a full-scale attack on the West Coast.97  Given Japan’s 
swift military defeat of a substantial portion of Asia and the Pacific between 
1936 and 1942, some Americans believed not only that Japanese military 
forces were unstoppable, but they also questioned the loyalty of the ethnic 
Japanese living in America.  This doubt was fueled primarily by the racial 
prejudices of General John L. DeWitt and the support of some prominent 
senior military officers.98 
                                                          
 92.  315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
 93.  339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
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 96.  See infra text accompanying notes 100–103. 
 97.  See Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 
933, 937–38 (2004) (discussing various arrests and evacuations of Japanese Americans on the 
West Coast post-Pearl Harbor). 
 98.  Id. at 938. 
 264 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:247 
 
On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 
(“EO”) 9066, authorizing military commanders to designate “military are-
as” at their discretion, “from which any or all persons may be excluded.”99  
This authorization sent nearly 120,000 Japanese Nationals and Japanese 
Americans to internment camps.  In a cluster of cases—Hirabayashi v. 
United States,100 Yasui v. United States,101 Korematsu v. United States,102 
and Ex parte Mitsuye Endo103—the Court considered whether the Executive 
had exceeded his authority by claiming emergency powers, or whether it 
was crucial to set in place an exclusion order due to military necessity. 
Given public outcry and the political demands surrounding these cases, 
the external social factors present another opportunity to examine the con-
straints on the Court when it balanced President Roosevelt’s unilateral 
claim of emergency powers during World War II and the suspension of Jap-
anese-Americans’ constitutional right to civil liberties.  The Court ultimate-
ly sided with the President, asserting that he had statutory and constitutional 
authority to act during an emergency.104  It is the dialogue between the Jus-
tices and the discourse utilized in these cases that highlights the doctrinal 
development and the entrenchment of the new path established by the Court 
in Curtiss-Wright. 
President Roosevelt did not claim inherent or exclusive constitutional 
authority, but rather he asserted constitutional authority given to him by 
way of being the President and statutory authority given to him by Con-
gress.  The Internment cases (re)confirm and validate Justice Sutherland’s 
assertion that the President can make foreign policy unilaterally; they also 
sanction the new path carved out by the Court in Curtiss-Wright—a path 
that the Executive has also subscribed to and, in the present cases, has at-
tempted to broaden. 
In Hirabayashi, the Court unanimously held that a Japanese-American 
citizen must obey the curfew regulations ordered by the Western Defense 
Command.105  While the nation was at war, the Court found, in both Hira-
bayashi and Yasui, that the application of curfews against members of a mi-
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nority group were indeed constitutional.  Justice Douglas wrote a concur-
rence in Hirabayashi and noted, “[W]e cannot sit in judgment on the mili-
tary requirements of that hour.”106 
Executive prerogatives were further called into question in the land-
mark case of Korematsu in 1944.  In a sharply divided six to three decision, 
the Court upheld Korematsu’s conviction for violating EO 9066.107  Justice 
Hugo Black wrote the majority opinion, which rejected Korematsu’s dis-
crimination argument.  Siding instead with the government, the Court up-
held the constitutionality of EO 9066 and, therefore, the government’s poli-
cy to relocate citizens in order to protect against espionage, thereby 
outweighing the rights of Korematsu.108  The Court reasoned the EO and 
the actions it authorized were a constitutional exercise of the President’s 
war powers.109 
While some actions taken by decisionmakers may seem unjustified, 
given the political climate surrounding the Internment cases—and in this 
instance, Korematsu—the Court reasoned that these decisionmakers are of-
ten faced with threats to the nation that call for extraordinary measures. 
Courts, at times, may “implicitly rely on the good faith of executive offi-
cials . . . as the unstated basis for overlooking civil liberties problems with 
the legal positions that the executive officials have staked out.”110 
Endo was the only Internment case where the Court, unanimously, 
found in favor of the plaintiff.  The Court heard both Korematsu and Endo 
at the same time, but delayed announcing the Endo decision until December 
18, 1944.  This was one day after FDR announced Public Proclamation No. 
21, which ended the exclusion order on the Western Defense Command.111  
The political timing of this proclamation was a reflection of the President 
ending incarceration and not a reflection of the Court reaching a decision on 
the merits.  In fact, the Court ruled on statutory grounds that EO 9066 and 
9102 cannot be construed to give the War Relocation Authority (“WRA”) 
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the power “to subject citizens who are concededly loyal” to detention in a 
relocation center.112 
V.  STEEL SEIZURE IS NOT THE END POINT FOR THE REACH OF JUSTICE 
SUTHERLAND’S OPINION IN CURTISS-WRIGHT 
A few years later, the Steel Seizure case of 1952 marked an extraordi-
nary moment wherein the Supreme Court, during a time of war, used judi-
cial review to check executive power.  On April 8, 1952, President Harry S. 
Truman announced that, to avoid a labor strike, the federal government was 
to seize the steel mills of all major companies involved in a labor dispute 
with the United Steelworkers of America.113  This announcement was met 
with uniform shock.  While presidents in the past had seized plants, never 
before had the government, during what was, by all intents and purposes, a 
time of peace, apprehended a major portion of an industry as central to the 
American economy as steel.  Nor had a president laid claim to inherent ex-
ecutive powers under Article II of the Constitution to defend a seizure when 
a statute—in this instance, the Taft-Hartley Act114—provided an alternate 
and legal method for thwarting the strike.115 
Truman’s actions created a political and constitutional crisis that solic-
ited fundamental questions about the role of the President and the nature of 
presidential power.  Steel Seizure afforded the Court an opportunity to reex-
amine the balance of authority among the branches.  More importantly, this 
was an occasion for the Court to reassess and potentially (re)define the 
scope of presidential power in light of almost twenty years of unparalleled 
exploitation of executive authority.  In this moment, Truman’s unprece-
dented action sparked the traditional constitutional and institutional debate: 
Did the President act with legal authority?  If he did not, what role, if any, 
did Congress play in passing judgment?  And finally, did that judgment fall 
to the Court? 
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Steel Seizure has become the 
leading authority—dividing the President’s authority into three categories—
for how the Court defines the relationship between Congress and the execu-
tive branch and how the Court determines whether the actions taken by the 
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President are legitimate.116  It is an opinion that is often cited by the Court 
and invoked by presidents.  While Steel Seizure demonstrates the limit of 
the executive branch’s reach and scope of power when acting as Command-
er in Chief, it also illustrates how external forces—the Korean Conflict—
did not constrain the Court.   
 Additionally, Steel Seizure illustrates why the Court did not find that 
the President’s military power extended to labor disputes.  The case took 
place against a backdrop of two decades in which presidents had steadily 
expanded their power and the judiciary had all but sanctioned its continued 
growth.  As such, this development of power led Truman to assert that he 
had the authority to seize the mills.  Truman believed that taking over the 
mills was necessary to safeguard the continued need of supplies to Ameri-
can troops in Korea and to support the healthy economy the nation was en-
joying.117  Truman envisioned a quick end to the hostilities and therefore 
attempted to downplay the seriousness of the course of action taken.  Dur-
ing a press conference, Truman definitively stated, “We are not at war.”118  
After being questioned by a reporter, Truman acceded that the United Na-
tions operation could be characterized as a “police action.”119  The Korean 
Conflict soon became a war in every practical sense, however.  As such, the 
Court’s decision in Steel Seizure is what some would call an unexpected 
decision.  Given the sizeable reasoning for Truman’s action, why would the 
New Deal-Fair Deal Court that had previously been so receptive to the ex-
ercise of presidential authority use this case to restrain the use of inherent 
executive power? 
From a historical standpoint, the decision in Steel Seizure is a sharp 
rebuke to President Truman’s seizure and an attempt by the judicial branch 
to immobilize the accumulation of power by the executive branch.  Justice 
Jackson criticized and rejected Justice Sutherland’s opinion in Curtiss-
Wright when he wrote his concurring opinion in Steel Seizure, observing 
that the language used by Justice Sutherland merely insinuates that “the 
President might act in external affairs without congressional authority, but 
not that he might act contrary to an Act of Congress.”120  Justice Jackson 
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asserted that much of Justice Sutherland’s opinion was dicta and bore no 
relevance to the issues presented in the Steel Seizure case.121 
An examination of the Steel Seizure opinions demonstrates that the 
Court’s holding was not a simple case of rebuke and not as sweeping as the 
broad language may initially suggest.  Justice Black, FDR’s first nominee to 
the Court and an ardent supporter,122 quickly earned a reputation for “deci-
siveness, forthright thinking, strong attitudes, and impatience with legal-
ism . . . .”123  In most instances, Justice Black favored government intrusion 
to regulate business and labor’s right to assist itself with the backing of aus-
picious legislation.124  In general, Justice Black interpreted the words of the 
Bill of Rights literally to thwart government intrusion with personal liber-
ties; during wartime, however, civil liberty claims had to give way before 
the needs of the government.  This was the case when Justice Black au-
thored the majority opinion in Korematsu; when the war powers of the gov-
ernment conflicted with individual rights, the safety of the nation necessi-
tated the sacrifice of the latter.125  With this reasoning, it was not 
unthinkable to expect Justice Black to sustain Truman’s seizure of the steel 
mills, given the hostilities in Korea, international concerns, and the admin-
istration’s assertions that steel was indispensable to the United States and its 
allies.  In this instance, however, the Court sided with Congress against the 
President’s assertion of unilateral power and found no congressional statute 
authorizing the President’s actions.126 
There is a tacit understanding that decisions by the Court are pro-
foundly impacted by the political climate surrounding a case at hand.  Sel-
dom, however, do Justices acknowledge this realization.  Then-Justice Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist’s book,127 written in 1987, recalls an exception that 
occurred when he served as a law clerk for Justice Jackson at the time the 
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Steel Seizure case was argued and decided.  During his time as a law clerk, 
he believed the Truman Administration was on solid ground with respect to 
legal precedent in Steel Seizure.128  So why did Truman lose by a vote of six 
to three?  Evidently, Truman’s delineation of executive power was too 
sweeping for the nation, and strong public opinion129 opposing his policies 
constrained the Court’s decision.  As then-Justice Rehnquist pointed out: “I 
think that this is one of those celebrated constitutional cases where what 
might be called the tide of public opinion suddenly began to run against the 
government, for a number of reasons, and that this tide of public opinion 
had a considerable influence on the Court.”130 
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion has had the greatest impact on 
contemporary constitutional analysis and “[n]o other statement by a Justice 
has so concisely and insightfully defined the limits and scope of presidential 
power.”131  Given this impact, Justice Jackson’s concurrence is discussed at 
length.  He split from the purely textual approach advocated by Justice 
Black, deducing that:  
 The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and 
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its 
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn 
from context. . . . Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, 
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of 
Congress.132 
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es a heavy burden on the individual citizen: it expects them to be cognizant of the use of executive 
power, to evaluate its use, to ask the Legislature or judicial branch to rein in that power, and to 
give its full support to the constraints imposed by either of the two branches. 
 130.  REHNQUIST, supra note 127, at 95; see also MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL 
SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (Duke Univ. Press 1994) (1941).  Marcus 
makes a similar observation.  District Judge David A. Pine’s decision, which held against Truman, 
“apparently influenced public opinion, for the Gallup Poll taken after the announcement of the 
ruling showed less support for the seizure than had been evidenced in previous polls.  This popular 
reaction, which theoretically should not have had any effect on the outcome of the [Steel Seizure] 
case as it traveled through the higher courts, as a practical matter became an important element in 
the legal decision-making process.”  Id. at 130.  
 131.  Louis Fisher, Foreward to MARCUS, supra note 130, at xii.  
 132.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
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Given this position, Justice Jackson sets out a three-tier framework, 
which not only addresses the relationship between Congress and the execu-
tive branch, but also stipulates how the Court will determine whether the 
actions taken by the President are legitimate.133  As many before have not-
ed, Justice Jackson divided the President’s authority into three distinct cate-
gories.  Tier one asserted that presidential power is at its zenith “[w]hen the 
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress” 
because “it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Con-
gress can delegate.”134  In such a situation, the President is dependent on his 
own powers as well as those delegated to him by the legislative branch.   
It is tier two, known as the “Twilight Zone,” that is of particular inter-
est.  Justice Jackson maintained: 
 When the President acts in absence of either a congressional 
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own inde-
pendent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and 
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribu-
tion is uncertain.  Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or 
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, 
if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibil-
ity.135 
In this instance, if the President’s power were in doubt, the legality of 
his act was “likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contempo-
rary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”136  It is this 
point—and to some degree, the two aforementioned tiers—that demonstrate 
the Court’s acceptance and willingness to take into consideration external 
forces and to be constrained by them when rendering a decision. 
 Tier three provided that presidential power is at its lowest ebb when 
it is “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,” as the 
                                                          
 133.  Id. at 635–38. 
 134.  Id. at 635. 
 135.  Id. at 637.  This could either be an indication of an expanded view of legislative deferrals, 
or it is simply politically unpopular for Congress to be seen as a war hawk.  For an expanded dis-
cussion of legislative deferrals, see GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY 
AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2003); see also Mark A. Graber, 
The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 
35 (1993). 
 136.  Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637. 
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President may only rely upon his own constitutional authority.137  In this 
circumstance, the President depends on his own constitutional powers, ex-
cluding whatever constitutional authority Congress could have over the is-
sue.  In this instance, the Court could uphold an executive’s action only by 
finding that Congress could not act in the situation.138 
The Court has embraced Justice Jackson’s three-tier analysis to resolve 
continued issues of presidential power in the area of military and foreign 
affairs.139  Justice Jackson counseled, “[l]oose and irresponsible use of ad-
jectives colors all non-legal and much legal discussion of presidential pow-
ers. ‘Inherent’ powers, ‘implied’ powers, ‘incidental’ powers, ‘plenary’ 
powers, ‘war’ powers and ‘emergency’ powers are used, often interchange-
ably and without fixed or ascertainable meanings.”140  Advocates of grant-
ing the President immense power can shift their claim to one of implied 
constitutional power. 
For President Truman, the Court’s decision came out of left field.  He 
clearly expected an auspicious ruling and therefore took the decision as a 
personal censure.141  Events occurring in the two decades prior to the deci-
sion suggested that the Court would not restrain presidential power.  The 
Court’s majority, however, was not swayed by the President’s assertion that 
the crisis confronting the nation was grave enough to justify a claim of in-
herent executive power to seize private property.  Despite the Court’s rul-
                                                          
 137.  Id. at 637. 
 138.  Id. at 637–38.  The extent to which the third category is applied is exemplified by Presi-
dent Reagan’s role in the Iran-Contra affair.  To justify their actions, the Reagan Administration 
used the theory of extra-constitutional powers.  At the time, aides to the President utilized the 
teachings of Curtiss-Wright and extended the notion of executive power beyond the counsel given 
by Justice Sutherland.  During the Iran-Contra hearings, Oliver North stated that the President had 
the power to authorize and conduct covert actions with non-appropriated funds—funds acquired 
from private parties from foreign governments.  See Iran-Contra Investigation: J. Hearings Be-
fore the S. Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and 
the H. Select Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong. (1987) (tes-
timony of Oliver L. North).  The issues at hand in Curtiss-Wright did not deal with this kind of 
dispute, and the dicta used to support the necessity of secrecy and confidentiality in foreign affairs 
in that case did not offer any support for North’s assertions.  But this incident does reflect the ex-
ecutive branch’s continued use of Curtiss-Wright. 
 139.  See infra Part VI. 
 140.  Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 646–47. 
 141.  See MARCUS, supra note 130, at 214–15. 
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ing, presidents have—with large success142—advanced Justice Jackson’s 
three-tier analysis as the legal authority to act unilaterally. 
VI.  THE IMPACT OF STEEL SEIZURE 
To identify the extent to which a president claims broad unilateral au-
thority in foreign affairs following Justice Jackson’s three-tier analysis, 
Dames & Moore v. Regan143 and Regan v. Wald144 provide another oppor-
tunity to examine the Court’s role in re-defining executive power in this ar-
ea.  In Dames & Moore, the Court found the President’s claim to an execu-
tive agreement, which declared a national emergency and froze Iranian 
assets, was grounded in statutory authorization because Congress had tacit-
ly endorsed the President’s agreement.145  According to the Court, the “gen-
eral tenor of Congress’ legislation in this area” allocated broad discretionary 
authority to the President.146  Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 
asserted that “[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘long-
continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a 
presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its con-
sent.’”147 
                                                          
 142.  The “zone of twilight” helps explain the successful use of power by many presidents sub-
sequent to this case and its ruling.  When President Jimmy Carter declared his intention to unilat-
erally terminate a defense treaty with Taiwan, his legal authority to terminate a treaty without the 
advice and consent of the Senate was called into question.  When this case reached the Supreme 
Court, Justice Powell echoed Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Steel Seizure, stating, “If the Con-
gress chooses not to confront the President, it is not our task to do so.”  Goldwater v. Carter, 444 
U.S. 996, 998 (1979).  Similar decisions were handed down in the cases involving the Reagan 
Administration and its use of the war power in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Grenada, and in the Per-
sian Gulf.  For example, in a war powers case involving President Reagan and Nicaragua, Judge 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who later became a member of the Supreme Court, noted “Congress has 
formidable weapons at its disposal—the power of the purse and investigative resources far beyond 
those available in the Third Branch. . . .  Congress expressly allowed the President to spend feder-
al funds to support paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.”  Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 
202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsberg, J., concurring); see also  Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (declining to exercise jurisdiction in a case challenging U.S. actions in Grenada); 
Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987) (declining to exercise jurisdiction in a case 
challenging U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 
1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding a lawsuit challenging U.S. actions in El Sal-
vador not justiciable). 
 143.  453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 144.  468 U.S. 222 (1984). 
 145.  Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669–74. 
 146.  Id. at 678. 
 147.  Id. at 686 (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)). 
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As a final point, the Court argued from a public policy standpoint that 
the President needed the freedom to act; in this case, the need to use frozen 
assets as “bargaining chips” in delicate negotiations.148  The Court declared 
that if such a power was not granted to the Executive, “the Federal Gov-
ernment as a whole [would] lack[] the power exercised by the Presi-
dent . . . .”149  Relying explicitly on Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Steel 
Seizure, the Dames Court did conclude, however, that the legislative 
branch’s failure to pass a statute articulating disapproval was tantamount to 
an invitation to the President to act unilaterally.150  For the Dames Court, 
congressional silence was indistinguishable to the sanctioning of presiden-
tial initiatives. 
The Dames decision demonstrates a marked—albeit engineered—shift 
in authority from Congress to the President.  And, because the opinion rests 
on statutes that do not directly speak to the issue, the decision illustrates the 
Court’s recognition of broad presidential power in foreign relations.  While 
the Steel Seizure Court did not speak explicitly to the issue of inherent pow-
ers, the Dames Court confirmed the relevance of Justice Jackson’s concur-
rence to finding that the President may possess inherent powers when re-
sponding to international emergencies.  The Court, therefore, emphasized 
the constraining external factors when considering cases in this area. 
In Regan v. Wald, the Court found exceptions to justify and sanction 
broad discretionary authority to the President when President Ronald 
Reagan restricted travel to Cuba because of national security needs—the 
ever-pervasive Cold War.151  The Court reasoned that the legislative branch 
authorized the President’s actions,152 and sanctioned them with, as Steel 
Seizure  phrased it, the “widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”153  Even 
though Congress asserted a dominant role by enacting provisions to “tie the 
hands” of the President and fence in the far-reaching scope of presidential 
authority, the Regan Court found in favor of the Executive.154  This deci-
sion demonstrated that even though Congress attempted to rein in the Presi-
                                                          
 148.  Id. at 673–74. 
 149.  Id. at 674. 
 150.  Id. at 678–79.  
 151.  468 U.S. 222, 230–244 (1984). 
 152.  Id. at 232. 
 153.   Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 154.  Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 244 (1984). 
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dent, it was up to the Court to determine what power and authority the Pres-
ident had.  Given the Court’s determination in this matter, it granted more 
power to the Executive, essentially stripping the authority of the legislative 
branch to statutorily determine what checks and limits would be placed on 
executive powers.  Furthermore, despite Congress’s post-Vietnam legisla-
tive assertiveness to rein in the powers of the Executive in foreign policy, 
the Court determined that this kind of opposition had essentially run its 
course.  The Court’s position on presidential control of foreign policy 
would therefore win out. 
VII.  UNPRECEDENTED UNILATERAL CLAIMS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
Two decades later, the Supreme Court would have another chance to 
(re)evaluate Congress’s role in the area of foreign affairs.  Following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration mounted 
an offensive war against, what it would deem, a nontraditional enemy; it 
was, therefore, a new kind of war—a “War on Terror.”  This contention 
suggests the necessity of a more robust review by the courts of the admin-
istration’s detention policies when balancing concerns of national security 
and the protection of individual liberty.  The set of cases challenging the 
Bush Administration’s detention policies are labeled, quite apropos, the De-
tainee Cases.  The Detainee Cases appraise the controversial treatment of 
the executive power used during the War on Terror by the Bush Admin-
istration—policies vis-à-vis the capture, detention, and legal processing of 
suspected terrorists since 2004. 
This cluster of cases includes Rumsfeld v. Padilla,155 Rasul v. Bush,156 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,157 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,158 and Boumediene v. Bush.159  
In the end, the Court sided with the Bush Administration on fundamental 
constitutional grounds, but constrained it statutorily. 
Even though this juncture, or constitutional moment, provided the 
Court with an opportunity to change the course taken by the executive 
branch and require a more dominant role by Congress, the Court ultimately 
took into account external constraints that sanctioned the President’s asser-
                                                          
 155.  542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 156.  542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 157.  542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 158.  548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 159.  553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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tions and assisted in developing a new baseline, one that established the ne-
cessity for taking into account the executive’s framing and assertion of an 
alternative understanding on how to handle a unique war.  The War on Ter-
ror was a nontraditional war, and, as such, necessitated actions contrary to 
traditional standards. 
Since 1936 when Curtiss-Wright was decided, granting implicit execu-
tive power, the clear trend of case law was to support the President’s use of 
emergency and war powers.160  The discretionary latitude afforded to the 
President is particularly evident given the response of the federal courts to 
President Bush’s assault on the War on Terror.  Even though the President 
sought and received congressional support for many of the actions taken to 
combat this war, the White House did not suggest, at any point, that it need-
ed congressional approval for the policies it implemented.161  In fact, Presi-
dent Bush, on numerous occasions, emphasized his unilateral authority to 
conduct a unique war how he saw fit. 
In June 2004, the Supreme Court ruled in three related cases: Rasul v. 
Bush,162 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,163 and Rumsfeld v Padilla.164  These three cas-
es address the President’s anti-terror initiatives and executive claims of uni-
lateral power.  The Administration also claimed the President’s authority 
was unreviewable by the judiciary and could not be checked by a co-
ordinate branch of government.  In two of the three cases, however, it ap-
pears the Court placed some statutory limits upon executive authority. 
The Bush Administration claimed that the President is granted broad 
war-making powers when acting in the constitutional capacity of Com-
mander in Chief to conduct a successful campaign.165  Moreover, the Au-
                                                          
 160.  See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, supra note 39, at 138 (“The Burger Court had several 
opportunities to read Curtiss-Wright strictly and thereby to rein in this executive practice.  On 
each occasion, however, it ruled in the president’s favor, approving rather than rejecting his self-
serving construction of the statute in question.”). 
 161.  See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority to 
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor or 
Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 506 (2002) (noting that in the past, “when Con-
gress has actually authorized troop deployments in hostilities, Presidents have taken the position 
that such legislation, although welcome, was not constitutionally necessary.”). 
 162.  542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 163.  542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 164.  542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 165.  Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 161. 
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thorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) Act,166 a joint resolution 
passed by Congress immediately following the September 11 attacks, 
granted the President considerable latitude in the conduct of hostilities.  
This Act also gave the President the authority to use all necessary and ap-
propriate force against those who aided or abetted in the terrorist attacks.167 
Rasul v. Bush was the first habeas corpus case to reach the Court.  The 
question before the Court was whether it had jurisdiction to hear legal ap-
peals filed on behalf of the foreign citizens who were being held at Guan-
tanamo Bay’s naval base.168  Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the six to 
three opinion, holding that Guantanamo Bay was territory under American 
jurisdiction, thus entitling the prisoners to habeas corpus hearings.169  More 
importantly, the petitioners’ rights to habeas corpus were not dependent on 
their citizenship status.170 
In its 2002 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,171 (“Hamdi II”), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit quoted Curtiss-Wright, as-
serting that when assessing national security concerns, the President wields 
“plenary and exclusive power.”172  Citing Steel Seizure, the Fourth Circuit 
also said this power is superior when the President acts “with statutory au-
thority from Congress.”173  While the court did not indicate which statutes 
might have authorized the President’s actions, it went on to affirm the Pres-
ident’s constitutional power—as supported by the Prize Cases and Dames 
& Moore—to conduct military operations, determine who would be consid-
ered an enemy combatant, and decide the rules governing the treatment of 
such individuals.174  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld175 (“Hamdi III”) in 2003, the 
same court concluded the President had near unfettered discretion when 
faced with an emergency, and it was inappropriate for the Judiciary to 
                                                          
 166.  Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codi-
fied as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004). 
 169.  Id. at 480–81. 
 170.  Id. at 484–85. 
 171.  296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 172.  Id. at 281 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 
(1936)). 
 173.  Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635–
37 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 174.  Id. at 281–82. 
 175.  316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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weigh down presidential decisions with what the court called the “‘panoply 
of encumbrances associated with civil litigation.’”176 
When Hamdi III reached the Supreme Court, the Court was unable to 
agree on a unanimous line of reasoning, resulting in the six to three vote 
that the AUMF granted the President authority to detain a United States cit-
izen as an enemy combatant because the President’s action was pursuant to 
an act of Congress.177  Specifically, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote 
that because “the AUMF is explicit congressional authorization for the de-
tention of individuals,” it gives the President the authority to use all neces-
sary and appropriate force against “nations, organizations, or persons.”178  
Justice O’Connor, however, reminded the Administration that the 
Rehnquist Court would not become a rubber stamp for an administration 
that was attempting to “condense power into a single branch of govern-
ment.”179 
In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the Court made clear that presidential actions 
were, indeed, subject to judicial scrutiny, placing some constraints on the 
President’s unfettered power.180  Ultimately, however, the Court declined 
on procedural grounds to rule in this case.181  Justice Stevens’s dissenting 
opinion is interesting, however, for a couple of reasons.  He asserted that 
the arguments stated by the Court could not justify avoiding its duty to re-
spond to the question the case raised: Did the President have the authority 
to detain Padilla by claiming a broad inherent or emergency power?182  Jus-
tice Stevens argued, “[t]his is an exceptional case that we clearly have ju-
risdiction to decide.”183  He further maintained that the case before the 
Court gave the Justices an opportunity to review the actions taken by the 
Administration and the constitutional claims made by the President when he 
                                                          
 176.  Id. at 465 (quoting Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 283–84). 
 177.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004). 
 178.  Id. at 517–18 (internal quotations omitted). 
 179.  Id. at 536. 
 180.  542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004) (explaining that the Court granted certiorari to review, in part, 
the legality of Padilla’s military detainment pursuant to the President’s determination that he is an 
“enemy combatant”). 
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 182.  Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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invoked inherent power—terms echoing Curtiss-Wright—to deny Padilla 
his civil liberties in the name of national security.184 
Ultimately, the amalgamation of Rasul, Hamdi, and Padilla provide 
the most definitive statement yet of what powers are afforded to the Presi-
dent when detaining so-called enemy combatants.  The Court, weighing the 
legal norms and external factors (the mutual construction process), was 
constrained by extenuating circumstances and found, in large part, in favor 
of the Executive. 
The composition of the Court had not changed in almost ten years, not 
since Justice Breyer replaced Justice Blackmun.  It had been its longest pe-
riod of stability.  President Bush, however, would have the opportunity to 
appoint not one, but two nominees to the Court in 2005.  This would yield a 
new Court dynamic, one that the Administration hoped would continue to 
vote in their favor.  Since Justice O’Connor—known as having immense 
power as a swing voter—was no longer on the bench, Justice Kennedy’s 
vote became the one to watch.185  Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence 
Thomas, and the newly confirmed Justice Samuel Alito were likely to align 
themselves with the Bush Administration, leaving Justices Souter, Breyer, 
Stevens, and Ginsburg to side with plaintiffs. 
The Court under Chief Justice Roberts would now be left to answer the 
important questions left unanswered by the Rehnquist Court when it ruled 
in Rasul, Hamdi, and Padilla.  For example, no five Justices could settle on 
the exact kind of legal process Hamdi or other enemy combatants should be 
given.  Of course, this lack of consensus was not necessarily met with dis-
approval by the Bush Administration. 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush were the two final cases 
for the Court to review.  The Court was split five to three in Hamdan.  Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Stevens concluded that special military tribu-
                                                          
 184.  See id. at 461 (“[T]his case is singular not only because it calls into question decisions 
made by the Secretary himself [under the President’s order], but also because those decisions have 
created a unique and unprecedented threat to the freedom of every American citizen.”); see also 
id. at 465 (“Even more important than the method of selecting the people’s rulers and their succes-
sors is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the rule of law.”). 
 185.  Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 
(2006), in which he concluded the petitioners had the privilege of habeas corpus, but noted the 
Court would not address whether the President has the authority to detain these petitioners nor 
would it hold that the writ must be issued.  Justice Kennedy also delivered the majority opinion in 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).  
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nals186 must either be established by statute or, if created by presidential or-
der, must follow rules and procedures consistent with the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (“UCMJ”) and the Geneva Conventions.187  Moreover, the 
mere assertion of inherent powers did not grant the President the authority 
to establish military commissions.188  The upshot of Jusitce Stevens’s opin-
ion amounted to a more systematic reproach to the Administration than the 
Court had issued two years earlier.  Procedures could not be written for the 
military commissions unilaterally—Congress had to approve them—nor 
could the procedures ignore Geneva Conventions; in fact, they had to com-
ply with the treaty.189  The courts also had an important role to play and had 
to be involved from the start and not just when the detainees were convicted 
and sentenced.190  Even though the Court ultimately invalidated these par-
ticular tribunals, it did accept the principle that the President has the author-
ity to order that those he believes to be unlawful combatants be tried by 
military tribunals so long as, the Court asserted, the tribunals were lawfully 
constituted.191 
Acting pursuant to the Court’s counsel, the President asked Congress 
for the authorization to create special tribunals operating under basically the 
same rules and procedures as those declared unconstitutional by the Su-
preme Court.  Congress acted forthwith and acceded to President George 
W. Bush’s request by passing the Military Commissions Act (“MCA”),192 
which the President promptly signed into law in October 2006. 
Even though in Boumediene the commissions were ultimately chal-
lenged and subsequently found by the Court to be an unconstitutional sus-
pension of a prisoner’s right to habeas corpus, the decision in Hamdan 
demonstrates the Court acting as a mediator between the two branches.  In-
sisting that Congress play a more prominent role identifies the Court’s 
prowess to force another institution to act in order for it to sanction, statuto-
rily, the actions taken by the executive branch.  Consequently, since the 
                                                          
 186.  A Combatant Status Review Tribunal was established for Hamdan’s case by the U.S. De-
partment of Defense on July 7, 2004.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 570 (majority opinion). 
 187.  Id. at 567. 
 188.  Id. at 593. 
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President sought, and Congress approved, statutory authorization, the 
Hamdan decision does not appear to posture a demonstrable challenge to 
presidential power during a time of war. 
Boumediene involved a more direct confrontation to the Bush Admin-
istration’s authority because it challenged the constitutionality of the MCA.  
In a five to four split, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that 
the habeas statute extended to non-citizens at Guantanamo as a guarantee 
under the Constitution, and that the MCA was an unconstitutional suspen-
sion of the federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear habeas applications from de-
tainees who had been labeled “enemy combatants” by the Bush Administra-
tion.193 
The Court’s assertions were a sharp reproach to the Administration’s 
contention that it could offer an alternative constitutional understanding.194  
In fact, the Court stated, it is not the “regime” that has the authority to say 
“what the law is,” but the Court’s authority.195  What this illustrates is an 
institution not willing to back down in the face of the Executive’s attempt to 
commandeer the Court’s role in defining the President’s powers and scope 
in foreign policymaking.  When challenged on the supremacy over constitu-
tional interpretation, the Court will confront the primary commitments of 
the majority coalition and (re)establish its institutional legitimacy.  While 
the courts have upheld certain due process rights of individuals classified by 
the Administration as enemy combatants, what these decisions have not ad-
equately addressed is the core war-making powers of the President.  As 
such, the Court’s (re)definition of those powers remain largely intact. 
The initiation of the War on Terror by the Bush Administration saw 
national security powers unavoidably encroaching on domestic issues with 
the U.S.A. Patriot Act (2001)196 and the newly formed Homeland Security 
Department—a multi-faceted agency that responds to tornadoes, floods, and 
terrorists.  The War on Terror has been a long drawn out effort that has be-
come almost a permanent fixture of our political reality, as the Cold War 
                                                          
 193.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008). 
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was for many years.  When the line between foreign and domestic policy 
becomes blurred, the President’s expanding pool of foreign policy powers 
will take on greater domestic prominence, which is sure to yield protests 
and political inconveniences that dare to confront a president’s monopoly 
over foreign policymaking—as was possibly the situation in the Steel Sei-
zure case. 
Recently, we have witnessed President Barack Obama utilizing the 
unbridled unilateral power that so many presidents197 before him have 
claimed—a power the Court has legally sanctioned.  The President is mak-
ing full and unprecedented use of drone warfare, which is quickly becoming 
the cornerstone of his national policy.  A secret memorandum released to 
the Senate by the Justice Department in February 2013 goes beyond what 
was said publicly about the legal justifications for targeting Americans who 
are suspected as operational leaders of al Qaeda.198  These broad interpreta-
tions by the Obama Administration may usher in new questions for the 
Court and we will see, perhaps, if the Court will find in favor of the great 
elasticity with which this Administration is exercising the commander-in-
chief clause, and whether the President can broadly interpret his power to 
defend the nation to include the use of drones.  As should be evident, even 
when the Court has appeared to hand a president a loss, Justices proceed 
with caution when evaluating the potential ramifications of their decisions. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
At the onset of military exigencies, Congress and the public at large 
give presidents enormous freedom of action in the realm of foreign and se-
curity policy.  But how the federal courts define the appropriate balance be-
tween security and liberty, which has the potential effect of constraining the 
Executive, is relevant to understanding how U.S. foreign policy and the re-
lationship between Congress, the President, and the courts has evolved.  
Adjudicating competing concerns over the security of the nation and the 
liberty of the individual presents a more significant challenge for the Court 
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than simply resolving domestic policy disputes.  As such, to understand ju-
dicial decisionmaking requires a better grasp of the factors affecting each 
Justice’s decision, including their alliance to bedfellows on the Court and 
political leanings.  In short, the Supreme Court tends to support a presi-
dent’s Hamiltonian view of his role in foreign policy.  This is evident with 
Justice Sutherland’s 1936 opinion in Curtiss-Wright—that the President is 
the “sole organ of the federal government in the field of international rela-
tions.”199 
While the Steel Seizure case all but relegated Curtiss-Wright to a foot-
note—describing Justice Sutherland’s opinion as dicta in Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence—this has not curbed presidents from asserting a dominant role 
in foreign affairs.  In fact, Justice Sutherland’s opinion in Curtiss-Wright is 
oft-cited by the Court to support claims of “broad delegations of legislative 
power to the President” and also “the existence of independent, implied, 
and inherent powers for the President.”200  Moreover, many politicians and 
the public at large generally have accepted this assertion.  This trend has 
exalted presidential power far beyond the constitutional blueprint advocated 
by the Court prior to 1936 and enters into the realm of unilateral executive 
dominance.  While the decisions rendered by the Court have not always in-
voked Curtiss-Wright, the essence of Justice Sutherland’s opinion has in-
fused other techniques invoked by the Court, such as the “political-question 
doctrine, grounds of nonjusticiability, and the silence and inaction of Con-
gress.”201  This overview of the past seventy-five plus years demonstrates a 
trend that perpetuates the usurpation of powers by the President and the 
overarching claim that the President is granted superior authority in foreign 
affairs.  Given this trend, extra-constitutional arguments as presented by 
those supporting a powerful executive have a sturdy foundation. 
Curtiss-Wright has never been overruled and, when viewed narrowly 
to only the decision rendered, no one has ever really questioned the Court’s 
ruling.  It has been an “authority” on which those rallying for support of 
plenary presidential powers independent of congressional delegation rely.  
For those intent on championing unilateral presidential action in the area of 
foreign affairs, or in challenging congressional attempts to limit the Execu-
tive’s discretion in this realm, Justice Sutherland’s profuse language has 
shown to be alluring: 
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 In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, del-
icate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to 
speak or listen . . . Congress itself is powerless to invade. . . . 
[T]he very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President 
as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of interna-
tional relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its 
exercise an act of Congress . . . .202 
Executive branch lawyers, therefore, understandably have not re-
frained.  As Harold H. Koh noted, “[a]mong government attorneys, Justice 
Sutherland’s lavish description of the president’s powers is so often quoted 
that it has come to be known as the “‘Curtiss-Wright, so I’m right’ cite”—a 
statement of deference to the president so sweeping as to be worthy of fre-
quent citation in any government foreign-affairs brief.”203 
While it is evident that no post-Steel Seizure decision by the Supreme 
Court visibly rested on the Curtiss-Wright decision as controlling prece-
dent, what this analysis has identified is a discernible change in trajectory 
by the Court in the area of foreign affairs.  Furthermore, the Court asserts 
its authority to define presidential power at the juncture of political and le-
gal time.  It is apparent from the analysis that Justice Sutherland’s opin-
ion—drawing largely from his early writings—also embraced some of the 
arguments presented by the government, and the political timing of the case 
placed the Court in the prominent position of changing the path trajectory 
of the executive branch, altering not only the subsequent path taken by pres-
idents, but also how an executive can frame arguments in the future when 
claiming a broad prerogative.  The Court’s dynamic institutional role influ-
enced the development of constitutional law and the political development 
of the executive branch. 
Curtiss-Wright is also a story of how a Court decision, at the juncture 
of legal and political time, can escape almost all of its contemporary con-
text, and how both lawyers and the Executive can utilize and reinvent the 
decision so that what it stands for has virtually nothing to do with the origi-
nal case.  As H. Jefferson Powell noted, “Marbury v. Madison rested the 
power of the Court to determine constitutional meaning on the duty of the 
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judicial branch to decide cases[, but] Curtiss-Wright suggests that the 
Court’s constitutional role may be, at times anyway, very different.”204 
The Court’s judicial tilt toward the executive branch caught the atten-
tion of such scholars as Edward Corwin, who argues that courts often defer 
to the executive branch because presidential exercises of power frequently 
generate changes in the world that the U.S. judiciary feels powerless to in-
validate.205  This analysis, however, demonstrates the sophistication of the 
Court and its dynamic role in (re)defining executive powers in the area of 
foreign affairs. 
The Court serves as an architect in (re)defining executive unilateral 
powers in foreign policymaking.  It is the continuous and constitutive rela-
tionship between the Court and the Executive that has elevated the Presi-
dent’s authority far beyond the Court’s early judicial rulings.  As Keith 
Whittington noted, “[t]he creation or recognition of a new power by one 
president necessarily empowers his successors . . . .”206  I would assert that 
as the Court (re)defines the Executive’s power in the area of foreign affairs, 
it not only empowers that president, but also grants to succeeding presidents 
the empowerment to act forthwith.  As such, we have witnessed the Court’s 
direct hand in shaping the growth of the President’s unilateral powers and 
institutionalized this prerogative in the area of foreign affairs. 
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